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Collingwood’s Critique of Oxbridge Realism 
Michael Beaney 
 
Abstract 
In chapters 3 to 6 of his Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood attacks the views of those he 
calls ‘realists’, seen as led in Oxford by John Cook Wilson and in Cambridge by G. E. 
Moore and Bertrand Russell. Central to realism, as Collingwood characterizes it, are the 
doctrines that knowing is a simple ‘intuiting’ of reality and that knowing makes no 
difference to what is known, doctrines understood as grounded in the logic of 
propositions, and in particular, the assumption that the proposition is the unit of thought. 
Collingwood criticizes realism for ignoring history, and argues that the logic of 
propositions should be replaced by a logic of question and answer. In this chapter I 
elucidate and evaluate Collingwood’s critique. 
 
1 Introduction 
R. G. Collingwood’s Autobiography is an intellectual autobiography. As he states in the 
preface, “The autobiography of a man whose business is thinking should be the story of 
his thought.” In chapter 1 we are already introduced to key themes in Collingwood’s 
philosophy. He reports that he received his first lesson in what he came to regard as his 
own subject, the history of thought, when he found a copy of Descartes’ Principia, which 
taught him that “the natural sciences have a history of their own, and that the doctrines 
they teach on any given subject, at any given time, have been reached not by some 
discoverer penetrating to the truth after ages of error, but by the gradual modification of 
doctrines previously held; and will at some future date, unless thinking stops, be 
themselves no less modified” (A, 2). The idea expressed here was fundamental to 
Collingwood’s philosophy. Let us refer to it as his historicist principle. As we will see, it 
underlies his critique of realism. 
The principle is also reflected in Collingwood’s account, still in chapter 1, of his 
growing realization that his calling in life was to think. All he felt at first was a general 
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intellectual unease, but as he learnt later, it was only when solutions to problems had 
developed sufficiently that he was able to recognize what the problems were (cf. A, 4-5). 
This also goes to the heart of his conception of philosophy, a conception he so elegantly 
articulated in his Essay on Philosophical Method of 1933. Here what Collingwood takes 
as his starting-point is what has come to be known as Meno’s paradox – the dilemma that 
Plato poses in the Meno concerning the supposed futility of seeking knowledge. Either 
we know what we are searching for, or we do not. If we do, then there is no point 
searching; if we do not, then we will not know what to search for (cf. Meno, 80e). 
Socrates’ response is to argue that there is indeed a sense in which we already know what 
we are searching for – and hence can recognize it when we find it. What we have 
implicitly are ‘true opinions’, and what learning does is bring these to consciousness by 
connecting them and ‘tying’ them down, turning them into knowledge proper, a process 
that Socrates calls ‘recollection’ (cf. Meno, 97e-98a). 
In chapter 1 of the Essay Collingwood essentially endorses Socrates’ response: 
 
in a philosophical inquiry what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which 
until now we have been ignorant, but to know better something which in some sense we 
knew already; not to know it better in the sense of coming to know more about it, but to 
know it better in the sense of coming to know it in a different and better way – actually 
instead of potentially, or explicitly instead of implicitly, or in whatever terms the theory of 
knowledge chooses to express the difference: the difference itself has been a familiar fact 
ever since Socrates pointed it out. (1933a, 11) 
 
Following Collingwood himself (1933a, 105, 161), let us call the principle involved here 
‘the Socratic principle’. In the Essay Collingwood teaches us to ‘recollect’ this principle 
by connecting it with his doctrines of the overlap of classes and the scale of forms. But 
we can also see it implicit in his remark in chapter 1 of his Autobiography that it is only 
when he has worked on a problem for a while that he begins to know exactly what it is. It 
is also illustrated at the narrative level in his account of how “the problems of my life’s 
work were taking, deep down inside me, their first embryonic shape” (A, 5). 
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2 Minute philosophers 
Like the historicist principle, the Socratic principle lies at the heart of Collingwood’s 
critique of realism. Indeed, the two principles are related: the Socratic principle might be 
seen as the epistemological correlate of the metaphysical, historicist principle. For if 
scientific (and philosophical) doctrines have a history, then it is natural to suppose that 
understanding them, too, has a temporal dimension. Chapter 3 of Collingwood’s 
Autobiography is entitled ‘Minute Philosophers’, a term he employs to satirize the views 
of the realists who were active in Oxford during the 1910s. As it becomes clear in chapter 
4, Collingwood attacked realism on the grounds that it “erred through neglecting history” 
(A, 28). 
 The term ‘minute philosophers’ (‘minuti philosophi’) was used by Cicero at the 
end of his essay ‘On Old Age’ to refer to those philosophers who denied the immortality 
of the soul. The term was taken up, most famously, by George Berkeley in his book, 
Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, published in 1732. In section 10 of the first 
dialogue, minute philosophers are described as free-thinkers who diminish “all the most 
valuable things, the thoughts, views, and hopes of men: all the knowledge, notions, and 
theories of the mind, they reduce to sense; human nature they contract and degrade to the 
narrow low standard of animal life, and assign us only a small pittance of time, instead of 
immortality”. Alciphron himself, on the other hand, as the free-thinker Berkeley was 
depicting (and criticizing), is happy to count himself as a minute philosopher. Since “the 
best eyes are necessary to discern the minutest objects”, Alciphron remarks, a minute 
philosopher is someone with “distinguished perspicacity”. 
 Although Collingwood makes no reference to Berkeley’s Alciphron, the Oxford 
realists would surely have recognized the allusion to the work of one of their greatest 
idealist foes. No doubt they would have regarded themselves as having “distinguished 
perspicacity”, while Collingwood saw them as diminishing “all the most valuable things”. 
The ambiguity of ‘minute’ may also have been deliberately exploited. We might capture 
this by saying that, on Collingwood’s view, the realists behaved as if philosophy could be 
pursued by simple acts of critical judgement and immediate intuitions of truths – acts and 
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intuitions that could be completed in just a minute, as it were – without having to 
understand the history of what it was they were criticizing or apprehending. 
Collingwood begins chapter 3, however, by mentioning the work of what he calls 
the school of Green – led by T. H. Green (1836-82) and including F. H. Bradley (1846-
1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), William Wallace (1843-97) and R. L. Nettleship 
(1846-92). He denies that this school can be described as Hegelian (A, 15), and notes that 
Bradley repudiated the title of ‘idealist’ as well (A, 19). It has sometimes been called 
‘neo-Hegelian’ to distinguish it from (true) Hegelianism, but despite Bradley’s 
repudiation, I think ‘British idealism’ is the best term to use. At any rate, it is preferable 
to ‘the school of Green’, which suggests that the dominant influence was Green rather 
than Bradley, who is now generally agreed to be the central figure. Collingwood himself 
calls Bradley “the greatest philosopher of the school” (A, 19) – “a man whose mind was 
the most deeply critical that European philosophy has produced since Hume” (A, 16). 
Bradley was certainly the main target of the realists – both in Oxford and Cambridge – 
who reacted to British idealism. 
Collingwood says virtually nothing about the specific doctrines of the British 
idealists, merely mentioning instead their influence on those students of ‘Greats’ who 
subsequently entered public life. At the time he went to Oxford, the influence of British 
idealism was waning, a demise that was only hastened by the relative dearth of books 
offering any accessible account of the central ideas of the movement. The only such book 
that Collingwood notes as having come out of the school was Harold Joachim’s essay, 
The Nature of Truth, which was published in 1906. In its preface, Joachim admits to 
having been greatly inspired (though not uncritically) by both Bradley and Bosanquet as 
well as by Hegel. It is perhaps surprising that Collingwood does not mention Bradley’s 
work. Both The Principles of Logic (1883) and Appearance and Reality (1893) may have 
been published in the previous century, but Bradley was still writing well into the 
twentieth century, publishing a series of papers in the journal Mind, for example, which 
were collected in Essays on Truth and Reality (1914). But perhaps Collingwood did not 
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count this as accessible enough.1 Although Collingwood’s concern in chapter 3 is merely 
with Oxford philosophy, it should also be noted that idealism was still flourishing outside 
Oxford. 
The dearth of books by the British idealists, according to Collingwood, left the 
field open for the realists. Among the Oxford realists, Collingwood identifies the leader 
as John Cook Wilson (1849-1915) and mentions two of his followers, H. W. B. Joseph 
(1867-1943) and H. A. Prichard (1871-1947). In his lifetime Cook Wilson published only 
on mathematics and ancient Greek philosophy.2 But as the Wykeham Professor of Logic 
from 1889, he lectured regularly on logic and epistemology, and after his death in 1915, 
these lectures were edited by A. S. L. Farquharson and, together with various letters and 
occasional philosophical pieces, published as Statement and Inference, in two volumes, in 
1926. Collingwood writes of Cook Wilson’s resistance to publishing, on the grounds that 
he kept changing his mind (cf. A, 19), and it is true that Cook Wilson continually rewrote 
his lectures. But he does seem to have wanted to make his views on logic available to a 
wider audience than his Oxford colleagues.3 Although Statement and Inference had not 
been published in the period about which Collingwood is speaking in chapter 3, it had 
certainly appeared by the time he wrote the Autobiography itself; yet he makes no 
mention of this. With over 1000 pages, Statement and Inference is a major work. 
Collingwood may not have read it all, but its publication was a significant event in the 
Oxford of his academic life. 
Collingwood’s criticism of Cook Wilson’s attitude towards publication reflects a 
deeper disagreement between the two about the nature of thought, which brings out what 
lies at the root of Collingwood’s critique of realism. In accord with the Socratic principle, 
Collingwood saw his philosophical writing as a matter of gradually working out his ideas, 
getting clearer and clearer about the problems that occupied him. There was no 
assumption of a final state of perfect understanding to be captured in a definitive 
statement or theory; what was important was the process of thinking itself, pursued and 
expressed through writing. Presumably, he felt that writing for publication was the best 
                                                
1 Collingwood had earlier written an essay on Bradley (Collingwood 1933a), which was published for the 
first time in Collingwood 2005; but this, too, is not mentioned in the Autobiography. 
2 See the list of published works in Wilson 1926, I, lxvi-lxxii. 
3 Cf. e.g. Wilson 1926, II, 870. 
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way to focus the mind, and that the resultant publication could help and stimulate others 
to develop their own thoughts. Cook Wilson, on the other hand, in accord with his realist 
principles, held that truth is independent of human knowledge, in the sense that what is 
true is not affected by being known to be true. Furthermore, according to Cook Wilson, 
we come to know what is true – where knowledge is possible – through acts of immediate 
intuition. Presumably, then, until he had intuited a truth clearly and distinctly, and had 
found the definitive statement that captured this intuition, Cook Wilson was reluctant to 
go public with his views. As he once remarked, “the (printed) letter killeth and it is 
extraordinary how it will prevent the acutest from exercising their wonted clearness of 
vision” (1926, II, 871). 
In Collingwood’s (published) writing, there is a clear sense of development in the 
thoughts that are expressed, and Collingwood seems not to have suffered (unduly) from 
the feeling that later elaborations of an idea required going back and ‘correcting’ its 
initial formulation. To have done so, on Collingwood’s view, would have risked 
undermining those later elaborations – obscuring their nature and motivation. Initial 
formulations could be left as vague or potentially misleading, in the knowledge that they 
would be clarified later, or could be clarified as occasion demanded. This is the Socratic 
principle at work in his own methodology. 
While there is clearly development in Collingwood’s philosophy, however, he 
never admits to anything as drastic as a change of mind. Even when he confesses, at the 
beginning of chapter 4, to having gone through a realist phase, he notes that he had 
reservations about realism even then. His aim is to show how growing awareness of the 
internal contradictions in realism helped shape his own views. Indeed, his whole 
Autobiography is an attempt to demonstrate the natural development of his philosophy, in 
accord with principles – and in particular, the historicist and Socratic principles – that 
gradually became clearer and clearer to him. 
In this respect, it is instructive to compare Collingwood’s autobiography with that 
of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). Russell revels in his rebellion against British idealism at 
the turn of the twentieth century, and in his later abandonment of the extravagant realism 
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that this rebellion initially fostered.4 As in the case of Cook Wilson, Collingwood is 
scornful of Russell’s changes of mind. He speaks of the records that Russell left of “his 
successive attempts at a philosophy”, and writes of the realists in general as stumbling 
“from one temporary and patchwork philosophy to another in a kind of intellectual 
nightmare” (A, 51). Of course, unlike Cook Wilson, Russell had little anxiety at all about 
publishing,5 so there is no necessary connection between realism and reluctance to 
publish. Perhaps Collingwood felt that Russell should have been more reluctant. At any 
rate, he attacks both Cook Wilson and Russell for their intellectual stumblings, for which 
he holds their realism as ultimately responsible. 
Cook Wilson is not the only realist that Collingwood criticizes in the chapter on 
‘Minute Philosophers’. He also mentions Prichard and Joseph. Prichard was White’s 
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford from 1928 until he retired in 1937, but 
Collingwood does not discuss Prichard’s views on ethics in this chapter (he attacks them 
later, in chapter 6, 47-8). Instead, he notes Prichard’s realist critique of Kant in Kant’s 
Theory of Knowledge (1909) and Prichard’s supposed progression towards complete 
scepticism (cf. A, 20-1). This latter charge is unfair: Prichard did indeed move to a more 
subjectivist position in ethics, but it was not a form of complete scepticism. Although 
there were changes of mind, no doubt provoking Collingwood’s scorn, Prichard remained 
an ‘intuitionist’ in both ethics and epistemology, believing that basic principles were to 
be intuited as self-evident. The problem was that he was a pluralist about these basic 
principles, opening the door to his later subjectivism.6 Nevertheless, just because of this, 
Prichard would undoubtedly count as a ‘minute philosopher’; certainly, he lacked that 
historical self-consciousness upon which Collingwood placed such emphasis (cf. A, 57-
9). 
As far as Joseph is concerned, Collingwood mentions his Introduction to Logic 
and his work on Plato. His book on logic was first published in 1906 and a revised edition 
(of some 600 pages) appeared in 1916. It is essentially a textbook of traditional logic. 
There is an account of terms, judgements and inferences (syllogisms), in accord with the 
                                                
4 See especially Russell 1959, chs. 1, 5; 1975, ch. 6. 
5 Perhaps the only notable exception is Russell’s Theory of Knowledge manuscript, which he abandoned in 
1913 due to Wittgenstein’s criticisms. 
6 For an account of Prichard’s ethics, see Dancy 2010. 
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standard Aristotelian division, followed by discussion of induction and scientific 
methodology, along Millian lines. Joseph makes no attempt to consider the mathematical 
logic that was then emerging, in Britain, in the work of Russell and others, which was to 
revolutionize logic. By the time of the second edition, he recognizes its existence, but 
curtly dismisses it for making “the error of representing either all thinking as a kind of 
mathematics, or all thinking as class-thinking, and mathematics as merely a special sort 
of class-thinking” (1916, 228; cf. viii). The book was influenced by Cook Wilson 
(acknowledged especially in the preface to the second edition), but from the early 1910s 
Joseph began to criticize Cook Wilson’s brand of realism, and as Collingwood rightly 
says, came to regard himself as primarily a follower of Plato. In granting a fundamental 
role to our supposed powers of immediate apprehension, however, he shared at least 
some of the epistemological views of the other ‘minute philosophers’, views which take 
centre-stage in the next chapter of Collingwood’s Autobiography. 
 
3 Inclination and intuition 
Chapter 4 of Collingwood’s Autobiography is entitled ‘Inclination of a Sapling’, a 
reference to his initial – though qualified – acceptance of realism. He reports that his 
tutor, E. F. Carritt (1876-1964), himself a realist (and a student of Prichard’s), had sent 
him to the lectures by Cook Wilson and the other realists. Collingwood writes that he was 
thus “thoroughly indoctrinated” with the principles and methods of realism (A, 22). His 
only reservation concerned the realists’ lack of regard for historical fact. Collingwood 
mentions Moore’s critique of Berkeley’s idealism and Cook Wilson’s critique of 
Bradley’s idealism: in both cases, he remarks, the views criticized are not the views that 
Berkeley and Bradley, respectively, actually held. At the time, though, he accepted that 
the realists were concerned with philosophy, not history, and that the important point was 
whether the doctrines they criticized were indeed false or not, regardless of who held 
them. 
 After his degree, however, Collingwood reports that he became aware of a 
conflict between the realists’ positive principles and their critical methods, and this left 
him with three options: to reject realism because of the conflict, to endorse the principles 
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but not the methods, or to endorse the methods but not the principles – assuming, in these 
latter two cases, that the principles and methods could be legitimately separated. 
Collingwood does not spell out the conflict; he simply remarks that “Cook Wilson’s 
positive teaching was incapable of resisting attack by his own critical methods’ (A, 23). 
What Collingwood had in mind here is made clear in the chapter that follows. As he 
characterizes it, the essence of the realist’s critical method is “to analyse the position 
criticized into various propositions, and detect contradictions between these” (A, 42). 
Applied to realism itself, Collingwood then seems to think, such a method soon detects 
contradictions between its own constituent propositions – and he presumably saw Cook 
Wilson’s (and Russell’s) own frequent changes of mind as evidence of the instability of 
realist views. 
 In chapter 4, however, Collingwood does not say which of the three options he 
ended up taking. He reports instead on his “flank attack” on the problem (A, 23, 28), 
introducing what he calls in the next chapter his ‘logic of question and answer’ (A, 37). 
His main idea is that “knowledge comes only by answering questions”, an idea he says he 
learnt from his archaeological research on the history of Roman Britain: “what one learnt 
depended not merely on what turned up in one’s trenches but also on what questions one 
was asking” (A, 24-5). It is this idea that he claims the realists fail to recognize in talking 
“as if knowing were a simple ‘intuiting’ or a simple ‘apprehending’ of some ‘reality’” (A, 
25). Such talk can indeed be found in the work of the Oxford realists, and in particular, 
Cook Wilson7 and Prichard.8 But as Collingwood remarks, similar views are expressed 
by the Cambridge realist G. E. Moore (1873-1958)9 and the Manchester realist Samuel 
Alexander (1859-1938).10 In the light of what Collingwood goes on to say, though, 
perhaps the best illustration would be Russell’s much-quoted remark in his preface to The 
Principles of Mathematics: 
                                                
7 See e.g. Wilson 1926, II, chs. 1, 14. As the editor of his work notes, Cook Wilson nowhere defines 
‘apprehension’, but seems to use the term for what he earlier called ‘recognition’: “the immediate 
cognizance of the object and conviction of its being” (ibid., 78). For discussion of Cook Wilson’s 
conception, see Marion 2000, §2. 
8 See e.g. Prichard 1906. 
9 See e.g. Moore 1903, 453, where Moore claims that “I am as directly aware of the existence of material 
things in space as of my own sensations”. 
10 See e.g. Alexander 1914, 283, where Alexander writes that “mind and its object are two separate 
existences connected together by the relation of togetherness or compresence”. 
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The discussion of indefinables—which forms the chief part of philosophical logic—is the 
endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order 
that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or 
the taste of a pineapple. (1903, v) 
 
Russell did indeed conceive ‘acquaintance’ as an immediate ‘intuiting’ or ‘apprehending’ 
of some ‘reality’. In his 1911 paper ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by 
Description’, for example, he defines it as follows: 
 
I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. 
when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I 
do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes 
presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is 
simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. 
That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say O is 
presented to S. (1911, 152)11 
 
 The view that Russell expresses here can be seen as encapsulating the realist 
conception that Collingwood criticizes: “The questioning activity, as I called it, was not 
an activity of achieving compresence with, or apprehension of, something; it was not 
preliminary to the act of knowing; it was one half (the other half being answering the 
question) of an act which in its totality was knowing” (A, 26). He goes on to say that he 
knows how a realist would respond to this, but refrains from telling us. A clue to the 
answer, though, is contained in the very title of Russell’s 1911 paper. For Russell would 
say that ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ is only one form of knowledge, the other form 
being ‘knowledge by description’. An object is known by description, he says, “when we 
know that it is ‘the so-and-so’, i.e. when we know that there is one object, and no more, 
having a certain property” (1911, 156). We need not be acquainted with the object in 
order to have such knowledge, according to Russell; indeed, non-acquaintance is the rule 
in cases of knowledge by description. 
                                                
11 Cf. Russell 1912, 25, where Russell writes that “we have acquaintance with anything of which we are 
directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths”. 
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It is not hard to see how such a conception leaves space for the questioning 
activity. A statement of the form ‘The F is a G’ might well be given as an answer to the 
question ‘What is a G?’. There need be no apprehension of the F here, and the knowledge 
expressed by the statement clearly has complexity. What Russell would nevertheless 
insist is that, at the ultimate epistemological level, there must be acquaintance with the 
relevant objects (universals or particulars). In accord with his theory of descriptions, ‘The 
F is a G’ is analysed as ‘There is one and only one F and whatever is an F is a G’. If this 
is the fully analysed form of the statement, according to Russell, then we must have 
acquaintance with the logical constants (which fill out the logical structure of the 
statement) and the concepts F and G (not the object denoted by ‘the F’, as there may be 
none: this is one of the points of the theory of descriptions).12 
 Collingwood fails to address the issue of whether, at some ultimate level, we have 
acquaintance with objects. We might agree with him that at higher levels, there are 
questioning activities essentially involved, but Russell would argue that questioning itself 
must presuppose acquaintance with objects at the ultimate level. The point is general. The 
questions asked must themselves make sense, and at some point we must reach a level of 
understanding or cognitive access to reality that cannot be seen as itself an answer to a 
question. This brings us to the logic of question and answer. 
 
4 The logic of question and answer 
Collingwood’s ‘logic of question and answer’ is one of the most well-known but also 
controversial elements of his philosophy. In chapter 5 of his Autobiography, which is 
simply entitled ‘Question and Answer’, Collingwood claims to have developed the main 
ideas during the war, when he was working for the Admiralty. Walking past the Albert 
Memorial every day led him to ask what George Gilbert Scott, the architect, had been 
trying to do. What were the questions to which Scott’s design was the answer? 
Collingwood also mentions his work in archaeology, which had impressed on him “the 
importance of the ‘questioning activity’ in knowledge” (A, 30). This led him to reject 
what he calls the ‘propositional logic’ of his contemporaries. Truth and falsehood, he 
                                                
12 The theory of descriptions was first presented in Russell 1905; the best account is in Russell 1919, ch. 16. 
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claims, belong not to propositions but to question-and-answer complexes. A proposition 
is always an answer to a question, and both its meaning and truth-value are relative to the 
question it answers (cf. A, 33-5). 
Collingwood says that he first wrote all these ideas out in 1917, in a book entitled 
‘Truth and Contradiction’. It was offered to a publisher but rejected (A, 42-3, 74), and 
Collingwood reports that the manuscript was subsequently destroyed (A, 99). It turns out, 
though, that one chapter has survived, and we also have a reader’s report on the book.13 
Neither suggests that Collingwood had developed anything at the time that might be 
called a ‘logic of question and answer’, however; and this is confirmed when we look at 
Speculum Mentis, published in 1924. In chapter 3, there is a section entitled ‘Knowledge 
as Question and Answer’. Here there is criticism of the ‘crude empiricist’ view that 
“knowledge is composed wholly of assertion”, as Collingwood puts it. Against this, he 
writes: “People who are acquainted with knowledge at first hand have always known that 
assertions are only answers to questions” (SM, 77). Question and answer, he goes on to 
say, are inseparable ‘moments’ in the process of knowledge (SM, 80). But there is no 
mention here of propositions, propositional logic, issues of meaning and truth-value, or of 
any new ‘logic’. 
If we look at the two other main books published between 1917 and 1939, 
namely, the Essay on Philosophical Method (1933a) and The Principles of Art (1938a), 
then we find no reference at all to the idea of question and answer. So it hardly seems as 
important as Collingwood makes out. In fact, the first talk of a ‘logic of question and 
answer’ occurs in the Autobiography itself, which is certainly surprising if the 
Autobiography is meant to be read as a record of his thought, with chapter 5 reporting his 
thinking around 1917. So is Collingwood being disingenuous in claiming that he had 
written all this out in 1917 (A, 42)?14 
In defence of Collingwood, we might appeal to his own Socratic principle and 
suggest that it was only much later that he appreciated exactly what the problem was that 
                                                
13 Collingwood 1917; Jones 1918. Cf. Martin 1998, 127-9; Connelly 2003, 116. 
14 Martin (1998, 126-9) considers whether the “all this” refers to the ideas of the whole of chapter 5 or just 
to those of the two preceding pages. I am in no doubt that Collingwood meant the former. I agree with 
Martin that “we have no firm basis whatsoever for concluding that Collingwood had developed a logic of 
question and answer in 1917” (1998, 129). 
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he had been thinking about while communing with the Albert Memorial and that the 
ideas he is talking about were only in embryonic form at the time.15 As the previous two 
chapters make clear, Collingwood had been thinking his way out of Oxbridge realism, 
and the idea of the interdependence of question and answer came to crystallise for him his 
fundamental objection to realism. This still leaves Collingwood open to the charge of 
being misleading, at the very least, in suggesting that the ideas were more fully worked 
out than they actually were; but he was writing in good faith in seeking to explain his 
objection. 
If this is so, however, then there is an irony of which there is no indication at all in 
Collingwood’s account. For the logic of question and answer has roots in the very 
philosophy that it was supposedly directed against – in Oxbridge realism itself. Even 
today this is scarcely appreciated, although that is due far more to the obscurity into 
which Oxbridge realism, especially of the Oxford variety, has now fallen than to any 
suppression of influences on Collingwood’s part.16 The key figure here is John Cook 
Wilson, whose Statement and Inference can be regarded as the Oxford realist’s textbook 
on logic. Part II of this work is entitled ‘Statement and its Relation to Thinking and 
Apprehension’, and Cook Wilson begins by discussing the notions of apprehension, 
judgement, knowledge and belief. Chapter 4 is called ‘The Distinction of Subject and 
Predicate in Logic and Grammar’, and it is here that Cook Wilson appeals to what 
becomes the central idea of Collingwood’s logic of question and answer. 
Cook Wilson’s main concern is to establish that what counts logically as the 
subject and predicate of a statement depends on the question which the statement is 
intended to answer. Take Cook Wilson’s own example, the sentence ‘That building is the 
Bodleian’. If the question is ‘What is that building?’, then ‘that building’ counts as the 
                                                
15 It might be noted here that there is no talk of the Albert Memorial in any of the surviving letters that 
Collingwood wrote at the time, so one even wonders how much of this story was a later reconstruction. I 
am grateful to David Boucher for this information. 
16 This is not to suggest that Oxbridge realism was the only influence on Collingwood’s idea of question 
and answer. As Collingwood himself notes (1924, 77; cf. A, 30), the basic idea goes back to Socrates and 
was implicit in Bacon’s conception of the scientist’s interrogation of nature, for example. There may also 
have been important contemporary influences, such as from Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Azande, 
operating from the mid-1930s (as Wendy James has pointed out to me in discussion). My focus here is only 
on Collingwood’s relationship to Oxbridge realism, which I nevertheless do think was central in the 
development of his idea of a logic of question and answer. 
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subject (as indeed we might take it grammatically to be). On the other hand, if ‘Which 
building is the Bodleian?’ is the question, then ‘the Bodleian’ is the subject, logically 
speaking. Cook Wilson’s point is therefore very simple: statements (sentences as used on 
a given occasion) are answers to questions, and we need to know the question before we 
can determine the logical analysis. (Cf. 1926, I, 117-20) 
In fact, this basic idea is by no means original to Cook Wilson. It can be found 
earlier in the work of G. F. Stout (1860-1944), for example. Educated at Cambridge, 
Stout taught there until 1896, when he moved to Aberdeen and then Oxford, before 
becoming Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews, where he stayed until he 
retired in 1936. In his Analytic Psychology of 1896, in a section on ‘The Subject–
Predicate Relation’, Stout writes: 
 
All answers to questions are, as such, predicates, and all predicates may be regarded as 
answers to possible questions. If the statement “I am hungry” be a reply to the question, 
“Who is hungry?” then “I” is the predicate. If it be an answer to the question, “Is there 
anything amiss with you?” then “hungry” is the predicate. If the question is, “Are you 
really hungry?” then “am” is the predicate. Every fresh step in a train of thought may be 
regarded as an answer to a question. (1896, II, 214)17 
 
Collingwood would surely have come across the idea from at least Cook Wilson, 
and while he may have forgotten this by 1939, one might also suggest that he was 
deliberately taking this idea from Oxbridge realism to turn against them – whether in an 
act of Hegelian synthesis or just as a mischievous dig. Whatever his motivation, however, 
we must recognise that, in doing so, he generalized it to such an extent that it threatened 
to undermine the rest of his philosophy. For according to Collingwood, it is not just the 
identification of subject and predicate that depends on the question which the statement 
answers, but the very meaning and truth-value of the statement. Yet even when one and 
the same sentence, such as ‘That building is the Bodleian’, is used to answer more than 
one question, there may still be something that the corresponding statements have in 
                                                
17 The idea is developed further in his later work. In his Gifford lectures from 1919 and 1921, for example, 
posthumously published as God and Nature (1952), Stout characterises a proposition as one of a group of 
alternatives that share a certain presupposition (1952, 102-4). The act of judging, Stout writes, “is always 
preconditioned by an interrogative attitude of mind” (1952, 276). For discussion of Stout’s views, see van 
der Schaar 1991; forthcoming. I am grateful to Maria van der Schaar for these references to Stout’s work. 
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common. This is what the traditional logician calls its ‘content’ or the ‘proposition’ it 
expresses. 
Collingwood, of course, wants to reject ‘propositional logic’. He formulates its 
central doctrine, which he calls ‘the principle of propositional logic’, as follows: “there is, 
or ought to be, or in a well-constructed and well-used language would be, a one-one 
correspondence between propositions and indicative sentences, every indicative sentence 
expressing a proposition, and a proposition being defined as the unit of thought, or that 
which is true or false” (A, 35-6). Now this was certainly a view that Russell held,18 but it 
is not obligatory. Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), the founder of modern (propositional and 
predicate) logic, for example, did not hold it.19 We need to distinguish this principle from 
a more basic principle, which I shall simply call the principle of logic: every sentence, as 
used on a given occasion to express a thought, has a content that can be expressed by a 
different sentence on a different occasion. 
This principle can be regarded, rightly, as an absolute presupposition of logic. For 
it is essential to logic that we be able to transform one sentence into another in order to 
better express its ‘content’ – whether we are attempting to say what is ‘really meant’ or 
just to exhibit or clarify the logical relations it has with other sentences (as used on given 
occasions). Frege was clear about this. In one of his most famous papers, he wrote: “we 
must not fail to recognize that the same sense, the same thought, may be variously 
expressed … If all transformation of the expression were forbidden on the plea that this 
would alter the content as well, logic would simply be crippled; for the task of logic can 
hardly be performed without trying to recognize the thought in its manifold guises” 
(1892, 184, fn. G). Cook Wilson, too, endorsed the principle. Although he regarded the 
identification of subject and predicate as depending on our apprehension of content (and 
hence as relative to the question asked), the content itself he saw as an ‘objective fact’ 
that could be described by different statements (cf. e.g. 1926, I, ch. 7). 
                                                
18 See e.g. Russell 1918, Lecture 2, 197-8; and for discussion, see Hylton 2007; forthcoming. 
19 This is controversial, and at least needs qualification. But all I will note here is that Frege undoubtedly 
held that one and the same ‘content’ or ‘thought’ can be analysed in different ways. Cf. the quote in the 
next paragraph. For fuller discussion of this, see Beaney 1996, esp. ch. 8. 
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The principle of logic is presupposed by Collingwood himself in his use of the 
Socratic principle. For in coming to know better something we already know, there must 
be some content in common. Indeed, this content is individuated in the process of coming 
to know it better.20 There need be no definitive articulation of this content, so we can 
agree that the principle of propositional logic is false. But the falsity of this principle does 
not imply the falsity of the principle of logic, despite the impression that Collingwood 
sometimes gives in advocating his new logic of question and answer. Even if an assertion 
of a proposition P and an assertion of its apparent negation not-P are answers to different 
questions (cf. A, 42), they may still contradict one another at the level of content, so that 
there is value in the realist’s method of analysis. 
Shortly after completing the Autobiography, Collingwood wrote some notes for 
his new logic (1939b). These are brief, and were never developed further, but what 
Collingwood is gesturing towards is a theory of speech acts rather than a new logic. Not 
only is this not incompatible with propositional (and predicate) logic, but its successful 
development requires such a logic (presupposing the distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics that we now take for granted). Collingwood’s own ideas about a logic of 
question and answer were suggestive, but there remained tensions and confusions that 
were never resolved.21 
 
5 Realism and knowledge 
The principle of logic might be taken to presuppose an even more basic principle, the 
epistemological/metaphysical principle that knowing makes no difference to what is 
known.22 For if we come to know a content better in improving the sentences that express 
                                                
20 The principle of logic is also presupposed in Collingwood’s doctrine of re-enactment and his conception 
of ‘eternal objects’ as what can be “apprehended by historical thought at any time” (1993, 218). On the 
importance of this for Collingwood, see Haddock’s contribution to this volume. 
21 For a more detailed diagnosis of what goes wrong in Collingwood’s appeal to a logic of question and 
answer, see Beaney 2005, esp. §§ 2.7 – 2.9, where I distinguish two notions of ‘proposition’, one the 
traditional logician’s notion and the other a speech act notion. 
22 In The Nature of Truth Joachim calls the assumption that “experiencing makes no difference to the 
facts”, which he finds in Russell’s and Moore’s work, “the fundamental postulate of all Logic” (1906, 33, 
36). Collingwood was editing the second edition of the book at the time he was writing the Autobiography. 
It was published in 1939, a year after Joachim’s death (cf. A, 18, fn. 2). Collingwood acknowledges his debt 
to Joachim’s work in two places (A, 18, 36). 
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it, then we must presuppose that this content remains constant. For if it were changed 
when we come to know it better, then how could we claim that we know that content 
better? Yet this is the principle that Collingwood attacks in chapter 6 of the 
Autobiography, entitled ‘The Decay of Realism’. He describes it as Cook Wilson’s 
central positive doctrine, and the only positive doctrine that realism could count as its 
own. 
 Collingwood reports that he read a paper after the war in which he argued that this 
doctrine was meaningless:23 
 
I argued that any one who claimed, as Cook Wilson did, to be sure of this, was in effect 
claiming to know what he was simultaneously defining as unknown. For if you know that 
no difference is made to a thing θ by the presence or absence of a certain condition c, you 
know what θ is like with c, and also what θ is like without c, and on comparing the two 
find no difference. This involves knowing what θ is like without c; in the present case, 
knowing what you defined as the unknown. (A, 44) 
 
The immediate point to make about this is that it only establishes, at best, that no 
one could claim to know that knowing makes no difference to what is known. This might 
suggest that the doctrine should simply be taken as an absolute presupposition of realism, 
for which no arguments can be given. One might have expected Collingwood to be 
sympathetic towards this suggestion, but he is not the relativist that his conception of 
absolute presuppositions is often taken to imply.24 One can indeed criticise someone 
else’s absolute presuppositions, and Collingwood certainly felt no inhibition in doing so 
in the present case. The fact that he does criticise it also shows that we cannot take 
seriously his claim that the doctrine is meaningless; if it were meaningless, then it could 
not function in the kind of argument that Collingwood offers (which attempts to derive a 
contradiction from the supposition that it is true). The claim that a doctrine cannot be 
known to be true does not imply that it is meaningless.25 
                                                
23 For details of the event itself (which took place in November 1920), see Patrick’s contribution to this 
volume. 
24 See e.g. Collingwood 1938b, 394-5. For defence of this view of Collingwood, see Beaney 2005. 
25 A verificationist would beg to differ, and although Collingwood may have flirted with verificationism in 
writing the Essay on Metaphysics just a year later, I do not think that that was his considered view. Again, 
for further discussion of this, see Beaney 2005. 
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 What, then, of the argument itself? The condition c that Collingwood has in mind 
is the condition of being unknown. Clearly, one cannot know something that is unknown 
at the time one knows it. That is indeed a logical contradiction. But assume, for the sake 
of argument, that in coming to know something, one knows that no change was made to it 
in the process. (Think of cracking open a nut and discovering the kernel inside, where one 
knows that cracking open a nut does not alter the nature of the kernel itself.) Of course, 
such an assumption is unproblematic if the realist doctrine were true, so the critic of 
realism might object that this simply begs the question. But all we need is a single 
plausible case to establish the possibility that in coming to know something, we know that 
it did not alter in the process. That is enough to show that there is no logical contradiction 
in the idea that we can know that knowing makes no difference to what is known. 
Collingwood’s argument is not the knockdown argument he seems to suppose. 
We might agree with Collingwood, though, that the Oxford realists never 
provided a knockdown argument for their doctrine. In fairness to the realists themselves, 
however, it is not clear that they ever claimed to have done so. Following Collingwood’s 
own advice to look carefully at the texts when a charge of contradiction is being levelled, 
consider the following remarks by Cook Wilson: 
 
Now we must know something about knowledge, and we know when we reflect that the 
very idea of it is incompatible with any such action upon, or suffering in, the object known. 
You can no more act upon the object by knowing it than you can ‘please the Dean and 
Chapter by stroking the dome of St. Paul’s’. … Obviously if we ‘do anything to’ anything 
in knowing, it is not done to the object known, to what we know, for that simply 
contradicts the presuppositions of the act of knowledge itself. (1926, II, 802) 
 
These remarks occur in a letter to Prichard, in whose work we find an even more explicit 
statement of the doctrine: 
 
Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the 
knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this independence. It is simply 
impossible to think that any reality depends upon our knowledge of it, or upon any 
knowledge of it. If there is to be knowledge, there must first be something to be known. 
(1909, 117) 
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Given the role that the idea of presuppositions comes to play in Collingwood’s 
philosophy, the use that both Cook Wilson and Prichard make of it is significant. On their 
view, knowledge presupposes that knowing makes no difference to what is known. To 
deny this is to deny the very nature of knowledge itself. There can be no argument for 
this, since any argument would rest on premises that would need to be known, begging 
the question as to the nature of knowledge. Knowledge and apprehension are sui generis 
and indefinable. All one can do is get someone into a position whereby they can 
apprehend or intuit this presupposition.26 Cook Wilson thought that if you genuinely 
know something, then you know what this involves: “The consciousness that the knowing 
process is a knowing process must be contained within the knowing process itself” (1926, 
I, 107). The idea is problematic, but not meaningless or straightforwardly self-
contradictory.27 
The basic idea here also informed Prichard’s ethics. In his paper ‘Does Moral 
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, published in 1912, to which Collingwood alludes (A, 
47), Prichard argued that it was a mistake to seek a single overarching principle of 
morality from which to derive particular obligations; rather, the grounds for each of our 
obligations can be discerned in our very apprehension of it.28 The idea is as problematic 
in ethics as it is in epistemology, not least because of its appeal to the conception of 
apprehension Collingwood criticizes in chapter 4 of the Autobiography; but these 
problems do not, I think, have their source in the central realist doctrine itself. 
Is there not an obvious sense in which knowing does make a difference to what is 
known? In coming to know something, whether it is an object, fact, proposition, or 
whatever, that something acquires a property that it did not have before, namely, that it is 
now known by me. The standard response to this is to distinguish between essential and 
non-essential properties, or between internal and external relations. The property of being 
known by me is not an essential property of that which I know; so the realist doctrine 
should at least be qualified: knowing makes no essential difference to what is known. 
Another way to put this is to say that, in general, the relation between knower and known 
                                                
26 Cf. e.g. Wilson 1926, I, 38-9, 98ff.; II, 803-4; Prichard 1909, 124. 
27 For critique of Cook Wilson’s views, see Marion 2000, 307-16. 
28 Cf. Cook Wilson, referring to Aristotle: “the principle lives only in the particulars” (1926, I, 43). 
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is external rather than internal. Now at the time Collingwood is talking about in 
criticizing the realists, there was a vigorous debate about the nature of relations, in which 
the leading figure on the idealist side was Bradley and the leading figure on the realist 
side was Russell.29 Collingwood does not mention this debate at all; what it shows is that 
idealism was by no means as dead and that realism was by no means as unchallenged at 
the time as Collingwood suggests. 
 How, then, might the debate between the realist and the idealist be resolved? An 
answer can only be gestured at here, but the starting-point, once again, is the Socratic 
principle. For (to state the obvious) in coming to know something, something must be 
taken as the same, in one sense, and something must be seen as changing, in another 
sense. It seems right to talk of the process of knowing as presupposing that something is 
identified as constant: this is what we come to know, even though our knowledge grows. 
Sometimes this is expressed by distinguishing between the object and content of 
knowledge: the object remains the same while the content is refined in coming to know 
something better. Some such distinction is clearly needed; there are various ways in 
which this can be developed. I think Collingwood himself provided one such way in his 
Essay on Philosophical Method, and it is both surprising and disappointing that he does 
not discuss this in the Autobiography, especially since, in the only mention he does make, 
he describes it as his “best book in matter” (A, 118). Perhaps his animus against realism 
clouded his judgement in the Autobiography; it certainly prevented him from giving the 
more nuanced critique that I think could be mounted on his behalf, which accommodated 
elements of realism that Collingwood himself had absorbed.30 
 
6 Conclusion 
In the penultimate paragraph of chapter 6 of his Autobiography, Collingwood remarks 
that the end of the realist movement “is one of those things whose history will never be 
                                                
29 The problem of relations was central in Russell’s rebellion against British idealism, and there were 
idealist responses to Russell. See e.g. some of the papers in Bradley 1914; Bradley 1924; Joachim 1906, ch. 
2. For an account of this debate, see Candlish 2007, esp. ch. 6. 
30 I have identified a source of the idea of a logic of question and answer in Oxbridge realism, but it might 
also be noted here that the Socratic principle, too, can be found in Cook Wilson’s work; see e.g. 1926, I, 
44-5. 
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written” (A, 51). Collingwood had in mind its disintegration into “a kind of intellectual 
nightmare” (ibid.). More than seventy years later, it is clear that this prophecy has turned 
out false. Within the analytic tradition itself, whose early founders Collingwood 
criticized, there has been an historical turn, as at least some of those trained in that 
tradition have been led to investigate its historical and philosophical foundations.31 
Cambridge realism has received far more attention than Oxford realism, or indeed, non-
Oxbridge realism, but even here there have been historical accounts.32 
Collingwood’s sense that there was something wrong in the realism of his 
Oxbridge contemporaries, however, has proved right. While his attack on the doctrine 
that knowing makes no difference to what is known leaves something to be desired, he 
correctly identified their appeal to ‘apprehension’ and ‘intuition’ as problematic. I have 
argued that Collingwood was wrong to reject the new logic that Russell did so much to 
establish, although he was right to criticize what he called ‘the principle of propositional 
logic’. The ‘logic of question and answer’ that he hoped would replace existing logic was 
too poorly conceived to take seriously, although the basic idea of question-and-answer 
complexes has certainly been influential. 
In the Autobiography, Collingwood exaggerates his opposition to realism, for 
reasons that are political rather than philosophical, as the final chapter, in particular, 
makes clear. As I have tried to show here, there is continuity as well as opposition, in 
accord with Collingwood’s own historicist and Socratic principles, which provide unity 
in the development of his philosophy. In the hastily written works of his last few years, 
when he knew that he may not live much longer, there are caricatures and exaggerations, 
loose formulations and weak arguments. But as Cook Wilson had once said to him, he 
had the gift of seeing the obvious (cf. A, 26), and he had a good nose for what was wrong 
in a philosophical doctrine or theory. When the story of realism does indeed emerge from 
                                                
31 The historical turn can be dated as having properly got going around 1990, with works on Moore by 
Baldwin (1990) and on Russell by Hylton (1990) and Griffin (1991). On the historical turn generally, see 
Beaney forthcoming and Reck forthcoming. 
32 On Oxford realism, see esp. Marion 2000 and Travis and Kalderon forthcoming; and on other forms of 
realism, see e.g. Nasim 2008. 
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the accounts that are now being written, Collingwood will have his own rightful place in 
it.33 
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